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) 
[Sac. No. 7544 •. In Bank. Nov. 18, 1965.] 
EDWARD S. MUKT ARIAN, as Executor, etc., Plaintiff and 
Appellant, v. ROBERT B.A.RMBY, Defendant and Re-
spondent. 
II] Quieting '-'itle - Defenses - Statutes of Limitation. - A 
father's action against his son to quiet title to real property 
deeded to the son by the father allegedly as the result of an 
error as to the father's intention was not barred by the three-
year statute of limitations (Code Civ. Proe., § 338, subd. 4), 
despite the fact that the father discovered the error on the day 
following execution of the deed but took no action until more 
than three years had elapsed, where the father was in posses-
sion of the property during the entire time title was in dis-
pute; no statute of limitations runs agaitist a plaintilf seeking 
to quiet title while he is in possession of the property. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Quieting Title and Determining Adverse 
Claims, § 25; Am.Jur., Quieting Title and Determinntion of Ad-
,'('rse Claimll (1st cd § 63). 
Melt. Dig. Reference: [1) Quieting' Title, § 36. 
) 
Nov. 1965] MUKTARIAN fl. BARMBY 559 
[63 C.2d 558; 47 Cal.Rptr. t83, 407 P.2d Istl 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacra-
mento County. Elvin F. Sheehy, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to quiet title to real property. Judgment for de-
fendant, on motion pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 631.8, re-
versed. 
Carl Kuchman and Edward S. Muktarian for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
Archibald M. Mull, Jr., Bill Holden and Michael S. Sands 
for Defendant and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In September 1961 William E. Barmby 
brought this action against his son to quiet title to certain 
real property. At the close of plaintiff's case, defendant 
moved for judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 
section 631.8. The trial court concluded that the action was 
barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to 
actions for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. 4) and entered judgment for defend-
ant. Plaintiff appeals. 1 
In late 1947, at age 75, plaintiff married for the second 
time. Defendant, seeking to prevent the second wife from 
acquiring certain of plaintiff's property, .urged plaintiff to 
deed the property to him. On December 15, 1947, plaintiff 
and defendant went to the law offiees of Mull & Pierce to 
execute the deed. Defendant gave no monetary consideration 
for the deed, and although the trial court found a confiden--
tial relationship between the parties, it also found that de-
fendant made no false representations with respect to the 
deed and exerted neither duress nor undue influence. It fur-
ther found, however, that the "deed ... and the recording 
thereof _ _ • were contrary to the intentions in the mind of 
plaintiff at the time of executing said deed. " 
The deed is labelled "GRANT DEED" and purports to 
convey the property to defendant subject to a life estate in 
plaintiff. The trial court found that "the day following the 
execution of said deed plaintiff discovered from the firm of 
Mull & Pierce the error as to his intentions as grautor in the 
granting clause and the recording of said deed." It is not 
lWhile 'his appeal was pending, William E. Barmby died. and his 
uecutor was substituted as plaintiff and appellant. For convenience, 
however, we will refer w WipilUU E. Barmb)' as plaintiff. 
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disputed that at all times after executing the deed plaintift 
remained in possession of the property and paid the taxes on 
it. According to uncontradicted testimony, he talked with a 
lawyer in 1960 about clarifying defendant's rights under the 
deed, but after the lawyer discussed the matter with defend-
ant, no further action was taken. In the same year, plainti1f 
sold three acres of the property, and defendant signed the 
grant deed. When defendant refused to discuss a proposed 
sale of 52 acres, however, plaintiff brought this action. 
[1] Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in hold-
ing that the three-year statute of limitations governing ac-
tions based on fraud or mistake bars his action. (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 338, subd. 4.) Since there is no statute of limitations 
governing quiet title actions as such, it is ordinarily neces-
sary to refer to the underlying theory of relief to determine 
which statute applies. (See, e.g., Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal. 
2d 195, 214 [1 Ca1.Rptr. 12, 347 P.2d 12, 77 A.L.R.2d 803] 
[relief dependent on rescission of a contract, rule requiring 
prompt action applies] ; Kenney v. Parks, 137 Cal. 527, 530 
[70 P. 556] [nondelivery of deed, Code Civ. Proc., § 318 
applies; failure of trust condition, Code Civ. Proc., § 343 
applies] ; Estate of Pieper, 224 CalApp.2d 670, 689 [37 Cal. 
Rptr. 46] [nondelivery of deed, Code Civ. Proc., § 343 ap-
plies] ; Turner v. Milstein, 103 Cal.App.2d 651, 657-659 [230 
P.2d 25] [extrinsic fraud, Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. 4, 
applies].) In the present case, however, it is unnecessary to 
determine which statute would otherwise apply, for no stat-
ute of limitations runs against a plaintiff seeking to quiet 
title while he is in possession of the property.2 (Smith v. 
Matthews, 81 Cal. 120, 121 [22 P. 409] ; Faria v. Bettencourt, 
100 Cal.App. 49, 51-52 [279 P. 679]; 1 Witkin, Cal. Proce-
dure (1954) Actions, § 111, p. 613; 41 Cal.Jur.2d, Quieting 
Title, Etc., § 25, p. 493; see Newport v. Hatton, 195 Cal. 132, 
145 [231 P. 987]; Sears v. County of Calaveras, 45 Ca1.2d 
518, 521 [289 P.2d 425] ; see also, Berniker v. Berniker, 30 
Cal.2d 439, 448 [182 P.2d 557].) In many instances one in 
possession would not know of dormant adverse claims of per-
sons not in possession. (See 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) 
Actions, § 111, p. 613.) Moreover, even if, as here, the party 
in po!!Session knows of such a potential claimant, there is no 
lIn holding that the defendant had pleaded the wrong statute of 
limitations. Keflfl/,Y v. Par'ka, 137 Cal. 527, 530 [70 P. 556J. did not need 
to decide and properly did not discuss whether any statute runs against 
a plaintiff while he is in possession of the property. 
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reason to put him to the expense and inconvenience of litiga-
tion until such a claim is pressed against him. (See Berniker 
v. Berniker, supra, 30 Ca1.2d at p. 448.) Of course, the party 
in possession runs the risk that the doctrine of laches will bar 
his action to quiet title if his delay in bringing action has 
prejudiced the claimant. (Stewart v. Rice, 30 Cal.App.2d 
335, 340 [86 P.2d 136] ; see DaSilva v. Reeves, 215 Cal.App. 
2d 172, 175 [30 Cal.Rptr. 81] ; see also Berniker v. Berniker, 
supra, 30 Ca1.2d at p. 448 [7].) In this case, however, the 
trial court erred in holding that plaintiff's action was barred 
by the statute of limitations and thus did not reach the ques-
tion of laches. 
The judgment is reversed. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., 
and Burke, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied Decem-
ber 15, 1965. . 
